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ABSTRACT
The recent proposal for tax reform developed by the Departmentofthe
Treasury suggests dramatic changes in the structure of the personal income
tax. One likely side effect of the changes will be a significant adverse
impact on the level of charitable contributions by individuals.
This paper evaluates the marginal effect on giving of various parts of
the Treasury reform plan using the existing literature on the price and
income elasticities of charitable behavior. Two explicit models are simulated
for 1985 using the NBER TiXSIM model: one with constant price and income
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The recent proposal for tax reform developed by the
Department of the Treasury suggests dramatic changes in the
structure of the personal income tax. In general, these
changes improve the simplicity, fairness, and efficiency of
the tax. However, one likely side effect of the changes
will be a significant adverse impact on the level of
charitable contributions made by individuals.
Numerous parts of the Treasury proposal affect the
level of charitable giving. In general, these can be
broken into two groups: proposals which affect the cost to
taxpayers who itemize of making a charitable gift, and
proposals which affect the number of itemizing taxpayers.
In addition, the Treasury plan eliminates the partial
"above—the-line" deduction for non—itemizers. This paper
evaluates the marginal effect of each of these proposals on
the level of charitable contributions expected in 1985.
The simulations contained in this text are made with
the National Bureau of Economic Research TAXSIM model.
*Assistant Professor of Economics, Harvard University
and Research Economist, National Bureau of Economic
Research. I am grateful to Andrew Mitrusi for his computer
expertise as well as the many economists who have made
suggestions for this paper.—2—
This computerized model, like the one used by the Treasury
Department, bases its computations on the Individual Tax
Model File produced by the Internal Revenue Service.
Currently, the model uses the 1979 Public Use Sample.
Detailed programs adjust this raw data from the 1979 tax
year to levels expected for tax year 1985. This procedure,
known as aging, can be adjusted to put particular emphasis
on the estimation of the parameters being studied. In this
case, particular emphasis was placed on the number of
itemizers, the level of their itemized deductions, and the
level of charitable contributions made.
The TAXSIM model also contains a program to simulate
the behavioral response of taxpayers to a change in the tax
law. Thus, the likely effect of a tax law change on the
level of giving can be estimated by comparing the impact of
current tax law with the impact of the reform on individual
taxpayers and estimating the behavioral response to the
change in the law using parameters from the economics
literature. A total of 25,443 individual tax returns are
used to provide a highly disaggregated measure of
behavioral response. Sample weights for each return are
used to estimate the level of giving and taxes for the
entire population.
This paper does not present any new econometric
evidence on the price or income elasticities of charitable
giving. The emphasis is on simulation methodology and on
the evaluation of the effect of changes in public policy.
However. Section 1 summarizes the previous econometric—3—
evidence that forms the basis for the parameter values used
in the simulations. Section 2 discusses the simulation
methodology used in this paper.Section 3 examines the
Treasury tax reform proposal in detail with emphasis on the
likely effect of the various provisions on charitable
giving. Section 4 presents the results of the simulations.
1. Econometric Evidence
As with most microeconomic studies of consumer or
household behavior, evaluations of the parameters which
determine charitable giving focus on two factors: the price
of giving and the income of the giver. The price of making
a charitable gift of one dollar is the foregone disposable
income involved in making that gift. For taxpayers who
itemize their giving, this price for gifts of cash is unity
minus the individual taxpayer's marginal tax rate. Gifts of
appreciated property face a lower price where the actual
price of giving depends on the ratio of tax basis to
current market value. Furthermore, in 1985, non-itemizers
were allowed to reduce their taxable income by half their
charitable contributions. Thus, their price is unity minus
half their marginal tax rate.
The income term used to estimate the impact of
differing incomes on charitable giving has tended to vary
with the sample the researcher was working with. Survey
data has tended to produce estimates based on reported
household income while data from tax returns has focussed
on definitions of income from the tax return such as AGI.—4—
Whichever definition of income is involved, correct
simulation procedure involves the use of virtual income1,
rather than measured income. This will be discussed
further in Section 2.
FeJdstein used a constant elasticity specification in
his 1975 National Tax Journal article which used data from
alternate years from the statistics_of Income.2 The mean
level of charitable contributions by itemizers was
regressed on the mean level of disposable income in various
income cells, and an estimate of the mean price of giving
for taxpayers in that cell. Simultaneity bias was
eliminated by using tax rates and disposable income faced
by taxpayers assuming no charitable contribution was made.
In essence, the price of the "first dollar" of a taxpayer's
charitable giving was used for the estimation. The basic
estimate of the study was a price elasticity of —1.24 for
taxpayers in the income classes between $4000 and $100,000
in terms of 1967 prices.
Feldstein and Clotfelter3 used household data from
the Federal Reserve Boards Survey of the Financial
Characteristics of Consumers for 1963 and 1964. This data
included information on the wealth and demographic
characteristics of the households surveyed. However, it
sacrificed the detailed data on taxes contained in data
from the Statistics of Income. The basic result was a
price elasticity of —1.15. Little sensitivity of the
result to the exclusion of non-itemizers was found.—5—
However, the authors did find some variation in the price
elasticity of charitable giving. In this study, lower
income households were found to have higher elasticities
than upper income households. This echoed a finding in the
earlier Feldstein paper as well.
Feldstein and Taylor used the 1970 Individual Tax Model
File in their 1976 paper published in Econometrica.4
Thisstudy used particular care in the evaluation of the
price of gifts of appreciated property. The basic estimate
of the price elasticity was —1.29. Feldstein and Taylor
also reestimated the work of Taussig5 on the price
elasticity of giving in the 1962 Individual Tax Model File.
They concluded that his initial estimate of —0.10 was in
error, finding a price elasticity of -1.06. One possible
explanation of the discrepancy was elimination of roughly
one third of the sample during Taussig's study.
All of the above studies used samples which tended to
contain more taxpayers from the upper end of the income
scale than would exist in a random sample of the
population. However, a number of studies exist which
correct this.
Boskin and Feldstein6 used data from the 1974
University of Michigan Survey Reseach Center f or households
with incomes below $30,000. Although such data is
necessarily not as specific as tax data regarding tax
price, it does contain a large number of non-itemizers.—6—
Thus, the variation in price at each income level was
large. The basic finding of the Boskin-Feldstein research
was a price elasticity of —2.54.
Dye used the same 1974 survey, but incorporated a
wealth variable in his regression equation. However, he
found a similar price elasticity: —2.25.
Reece also avoided the problem of oversampling
well-to-do taxpayers by using the 1972-3 Consumer
Expenditure Survey compiled by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics. Reece used a Tobit procedure to take account
of the large number of "zero" entries for contributions.
His basic finding was a price elasticity of
Feenberg9 incorporated the effect of state income
taxes on charitable giving in a study performed using the
National Bureau of Economic Research TAXSIM model which he
augmented with detailed modelling of 50 state income tax
systems. His basic estimate of a price elasticity of —1.23
highlights the importance of the proper specification of
price in the estimation procedure.
Clotfelter and Steurle used the 1975 Individual Tax
Model File to estimate a price elasticity of -1.27 for the
population as a whole.1° They also decomposed the
population into 5 different income classes and estimated
behavioral parameters using 4 different econometric
specifications. The results showed a high degree of
sensitivity to the regression specification. It may be
that this sensitivity is the result of a high degree of—7—
mu]ticolinearity between price and income at low income
levels.
The present paper uses a price elasticity estimate of
—1.2 for the simulation of the effect of the Treasury tax
reform proposal on charitable giving for a constant
elasticity specification. An income elasticity of 0.7 is
also used. These parameters fall well within the range of
estimates provided above.
The assumption of a constant price elasticity greater
than unity is a matter of some debate. As various
provisions of the Treasury proposal are likely to affect
different income groups differently, this is an important
consideration. The econometric evidence is somewhat
ambiguous, however.
Feldstein and Taylor11 estimated constant elasticity
equations separately for various income classes. Using the
1962 tax model file, they found an elasticity of -3.67
between $4,000 and $20,000, —0.97 between $20,000 and
$50,000, —1.10 between $50,000 and $100,000 and —1.29 for
incomes over $100,000. On the other hand, their findings
for the 1970 file showed a small (-0.35) and insignificant
elasticity under $20,000 rising monotonically in both
magnitude and significance to —1.74 for the over $100,000
group.
Feldstein's12 earlier work using Statistics of Income
data from alternate years showed a declining elasticity as—8—
income rose. Taxpayer groups between $4,000 and $10,000
had a price elasticity of —1.8, while the elasticity
declined to —1.04 and -1.13 for groups between $10,000 and
$20,000 and between $20,000 and $100,000. Taxpayers over
$100,000 had an elasticity of —0.29. As noted earlier,
Feldstein and Clotfelter found a similar declining
elasticity.
Clotfelter and Stuer].e13 reported a generally rising
price elasticity with income. Using data from the 1975 tax
model, elasticities rose from a not significant —0.95 under
$10,000 to —1.35 between $10,000 and $20,000, —1.66 between
$20,000 and $50,000, —1.36 between $50,000 and $100,000 and
-1.78 over $100,000. Clotfelter and Steurle also used a
translog model to estimate parameters for different income
classes and found a price elasticity rising with income
from —0.42 to —1.51.
Dennis, Rudney, and Wyscarver14 used a linear
expenditure system to estimate elasticities for different
income groups. This system permits differentiation for
elasticities for discretionary giving, as opposed to total
giving. However, their specification was unnecessarily
rigid, requiring all price elasticities to be either
greater than or less than unity.
The choice of a variable elasticity model is most
appropriate if one feels that elasticities vary
significantly across income classes. In that case, the—9—
nature of the sample in the constant elasticity model might
affect the results. For example, Auten and Rudney15
claim that the finding of a price elasticity greater than
unity by Feldstein depended crucially on the sample used.
Specifically, they argue that the sample contains a higher
proportion of high income individuals than is found in the
population at large.
I
However, at least three studies which undersapied high
income individuals found significant elasticities all well
over unity: Boskin, Dye, and Reece. Furthermore, the
early studies by Feldstein and Feldstein-Clotfelter both
found higher elasticities among low income groups than
among high income groups.
The case for selecting one model over another is
unclear. Therefore, this paper shall simulate a variable
elasticity model as we].]. as a constant elasticity model.
The elasticities are presented in Table 1. They are
derived from estimates calculated by Charles Clotfelter16
updated to 1985 income levels.
2. Simulation Technique
The basic proposal to be analyzed in this paper is the
Treasury tax reform plan submitted to the President in
November, 1984. The NBER TAXSIM model accomplishes this by
examining a stratified random sample of 25,443 taxpayers
and simulating the behavior of each under both the current—10—
law and the Treasury proposal. Under the assumptions of
this modelling procedure, a standard constant elasticity
model of taxpayer demand for charitable giving is assumed
for any given taxpayer. In the variable elasticity model,
different taxpayers have different elasticities, however.
Given a current level of charitable giving G0, the
taxpayer selects a new level of charitable giving G1
based on the changes in the price of giving and his income.
Equation 1 expresses this behavior mathematically.
(1) in G1 =lnG0 +aln(Y1/Y0) +Bln(P1/p0)
In this case, represents the income elasticity of the
taxpayer while B represents the price elasticity.
The income and price relevant for simulating a taxpayer's
behaviorial response to a tax law change is the taxpayer's
virtual income and last dollar price. Economists maintain that
taxpayer behavior is based on the marginal incentive faced by
the individual. This marginal incentive is the price of giving
one additional dollar, or alternatively one less dollar. In
either event, the relevant price is the price faced on the last
dollar of charitable contribution made.
Figure 1 illustrates the budget constraint of a taxpayer.
Disposable income is on the horizontal axis while charitable
giving is on the verticie axis. The price of giving is given by
the reciprocal of the slope of the budget constraint.—11—
Thebudget constraint in Figure 1 exhibits decreasing slope
because as the taxpayer contributes increasing amounts to
charity, his taxable income falls, thereby reducing the
marginal tax rate he faces. As the taxpayer's marginal tax
rate falls, the price of giving rises, eventually
approaching unity when the taxpayer has no more taxable
income, or his taxable income has reached the zero bracket
amount.
The actual price of giving can be represented as a
weighted average of the cash price and the price of giving
appreciated property. This latter price traditionally has
been calculated using the convention established by
Feldstein and Taylor17. Mathematically, the price is
expressed by equation 2.
(2) P =c(1—rate)+(1—c)(1—rate-O.5
*cgrate)
In this expression, c represents the proportion of the
gifts made by the taxpayer's income class in the form of
cash, while 1—c represents the fraction of gifts in the
form of appreciated property. The taxpayer's marginal tax
rate, denoted "rate", represents the change in tax
liability for the receipt of another dollar of taxable
income. As such, this rate represents the rate applicable
to the last dollar of a taxpayers charitable contribution.
The term "cgratet' represents the effective tax rate on—12—
the receipt of another dollar of capital gains income. By
making a gift of appreciated property, the taxpayer forgoes
capital gains tax on the gift as well as receiving a tax
deduction at the ordinary rate. Feldstein and Taylor
estimated that the proportion of gifts of appreciated
property that represented capital gain was one half if one
includes the potential benefits of delaying realization.
However, other evidence suggests that the proportion of
appreciation to fair market value in gifts of appreciated
property may well vary with income. Auten and Rudney18
have reported the ratio of appreciation to fair market
value of assets sold by taxpayers in the 1971-75 period and
reported on Schedule D in the sample on which their study
is based. This data shows a monotonic rise in appreciation
as a percent of sales price as income rises.
Moreover, it is reasonable to expect that gifts of
appreciated property have a higher appreciation share than
assets sold for ordinary consumption uses. Tax minimizing
behavior would dictate such a result. This study therefore
adjusts the Auten-Rudney numbers to produce the weighted
average 50 percent appreciation produced by Feldsteinand
Taylor. The resulting appreciation percentages are shown
in Table 2. The weighted average price of giving therefore
represents a combination of appreciation and tax rate.
This weighted average price, evaluated at the last dollar
given is the price used in the simulations.—13--
As Figure 1 illustrates, however, inframarginal dollars
of charitable giving may well have cost the taxpayer less
than the last dollar contributed. The low cost dollars
given inframarginally do not affect the marginal cost of
making a contribution. However, they do increase the income
of the taxpayer. The amount of the increase in income is
the difference between the marginal price of giving and the
inframarginal price.
In order to show the taxpayer's virtual income
graphically, the segment of the taxpayer's budget
constraint on which he is operating is extended to the
horizontal axis. In effect, because the taxpayer is acting
on the assumption that the price of giving is that
reflected by the segment of the budget constraint on which
his utility is maximized, the relevant income must
correspond to that assumption. That relevant income is the
taxpayer's virtual income.19
It should be noted that a floor follows the same
procedure but with the opposite sign. If the taxpayer is
contributing an amount in excess of the floor, economists
would argue that his relevant price is unaffected by the
floor. However, the floor does impose an income effect.
The taxpayer's income is reduced by the difference between
the actual price of giving those inframarginal dollars and
the price of the marginal dollar of contributions. Thus, a
floor reduces the taxpayer's virtual income by his marginal—14—
tax rate (unity minus the price of giving) times the amount
of the floor.
The imposition of a floor, as in the Treasury proposal,
creates another simulation complexity. When confronted
with one price of giving and corresponding virtual income,
the taxpayer chooses one segment of the budget set, but
when confronted with another price and virtual income,
chooses another segment. In the case of the floor, the
budget set is concave to the origin and therefore there is
no a priori means of choosing between the two
possibilities.
Instead, an explicit indirect utility format must be
used which compares the utility of the taxpayer at each
point on the budget set. The relevant indirect utility for
a log linear demand equation was developed by Hausman.2°
The indirect utility for the taxpayer in question is
compared at each of the two possible utility maximizing
points, and the higher utility is chosen. A key advantage
of the NBER TAXSIM model is its ability to simulate changes
in the law at the level of the individual taxpayer. Thus
special cases such as a floor can be simulated directly.
Floors also create the possibility of bunching of
charitable gifts. If for example, the taxpayer faces a
floor of $300 and makes annual contributions of $200, he
may benefit from making gifts of $400 every second year.
However, in a recent study of the possible magnitudes of—15—
such an effect, Feldstein and Lindsey21 found the likely
effect to be small.
The simulation procedure therefore evaluates the price
and virtual income of each taxpayer under both current law
and under the Treasury proposal. The utility maximizing
choice of charitable contributions is selected.
This simulation estimates the response of taxpayers
f or the 1985 tax year. As mentioned earlier, the basic
data used was from the 1979 individual tax model file. In
order to create the 1985 model, an aging routine was
created which increased the individual income amounts and
the sample weights for taxpayers to reflect 1985 income and
population levels. Changes in the functional distribution
of income between 1979 and 1985 were included by raising
each component of income for each taxpayer by an amount
reflecting the growth of that type of income in the overall
economy.
Particular attention was paid to the number of
itemizers and their level of charitable contributions for
the tax year 1985. First, the number of itemizers was
targetted for each income bracket based on the total number
of taxpayers in that bracket and the proportion of
taxpayers in that bracket who itemized in 1979. Then the
level of itemized deductions for each taxpayer in each
income bracket was adjusted to, again, reflect the average
level of itemized deductions for taxpayers in the same
nominal income bracket in 1979.—16—
The result of this procedure is the creation of a
hypothetical 1985 sample of tax returns reflecting the
demographic, economic, and tax conditions for that year.
The tax laws were also adjusted to reflect 1985
conditions. In the case of current law, the provisions of
the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 were incorporated into
the law.
It was also necessary to impute a level of giving for
non-itemizers. The Tax Model File used for the simulations
was based on 1979 tax returns. The level of charitable
giving for non-itemizers was not given by the taxpayer and
therefore does not appear on the file.
In order to estimate giving by non-itemizers, the
distribution of giving as a percent of AGI for itemizers
was computed for each of 24 income classes. Separate
distributions were computed for married taxpayers filing
jointly and for all other taxpayers. Although the actual
distribution of giving as a percent of AGI is continuous,
computational tractability required an approximation using
15 discrete brackets. These brackets provided the basis
for computing a cumulative distribution for each income
group and marital status.
For each non—itemizer in the sample, a random number
between zero and unity was selected. This random number
was used to select the percentile of giving for the
taxpayer in his income and marital status group. The
non-itemizer was assigned a level of giving as a share of—17—
AGI which corresponded to the giving of an itemizing
taxpayer in the selected percentile.
However, the non-itemizer faced a different price of
giving than the itemizer to whom he was matched. The
implied price of giving had the taxpayer itemized in the
model year (1979) was computed and giving adjusted downward
to reflect an actual price of giving of unity.
The non-itemizer was then "aged" along with the rest of
sample to reflect 1985 income and giving levels. In 1985,
non—itemizers were allowed an "above—the-line" deduction
equal to one half of charitable contributions. A new,
1985, price of giving was computed and actual charitable
giving for that year adjusted upward to reflect that price.
In modelling the effect of a change in the law, the
Treasury tax plan was assumed to be fully implemented.
That is, provisions such as the capital gains rules
changes, which are phased in over a period of years, were
assumed to be fully in place. In those situations, such as
fringe benefits, where no tax data was available,
imputations were made based on other sources of data.
Although some of these imputations are rough, any effect of
them on charitable giving is likely to be small. The next
section describes those aspects of the Treasury proposal
which are likely to have a signficant impact on the level
of charitable giving.—18—
3. The Treasury Proposal
The Treasury proposal contains six changes with direct
impact on the level of charitable giving by itemizers:
o Reduction in marginal tax rates
o Changes in the tax treatment of capital gains and
appreciated property
o Increase in the zero bracket amount and reduction of
allowable deductions
o .A 2 percent of AGI floor on deductibility of
charitable contributions
o The elimination of the "above the line deduction" for
non—itemizers
o Removal of the ceiling on deductibility of charitable
gifts of 50 percent of AGI
The first two of these changes affect charitable
contributions by raising the net-of-tax price of giving for
those who itemize their charitable contributions. The next
three changes alter the number of taxpayers eligible for
some tax reduction due to their contributions. The final
proposal affects only extremely large donors and is
modelled explicitly through the use of a "last dollar"
price.
The simulations estimate that there will be 104.4
million total tax filers in 1985, up 9 percent from the
recession depressed level of 1982. Of these, an estimated—19—
42.7 million, or 41 percent, will itemize their deductions
in 1985. This latter figure is up substantially from the 35
percent who itemized in 1982 largely due to the growth of
nominal income over the period while the zero bracket
stayed roughly constant.
The effect of the first two provisions discussed above
is an increase of about 10 percent in the average price of
giving for these itemizers assuming all continue to itemize
under the Treasury plan. Under the Treasury proposal, the
distinction between gifts of cash and gifts of appreciated
property is in principle eliminated. Gifts of property are
allowed a deduction equal to the lesser of indexed basis or
fair market value. If a particular piece of property has
an indexed basis in excess of fair market value, the
taxpayer may contribute the property to a charitable
organization and receive a reduction in taxes equal to his
marginal tax rate times the current value of the gift. The
appropriate price would be unity minus the taxpayer's
marginal rate.
However, if the indexed basis does exceed the fair
market value of the property, it would be in the taxpayer's
Interest not to give the property to a charity, but to
realize the implied capital loss through sale of the
property. The price implied by the discussion above must
therefore be described as artificial.
Feldstein, Slemrod and Yitzhakits22 work on the—20—
taxation of capital gains highlights the importance of this
consideration. They found that the capital gains realized
in 1973 actually represented real losses. That is, had the
basis been indexed as the Treasury proposal suggests, there
would have been no net capital gains. On net, asset
holders would be in the situation described above, with
property that it is illogical to contribute to charity. If
this represents a binding constraint, it must be concluded
that the effect on the contribution of appreciated property
would be more dramatic than the simple price effect.
On the other hand, if the taxpayer has a property with
an indexed basis below fair market value, the taxpayer
could make a gift of the property and receive a reduction
in taxable income equal to the property's indexed basis.
It should be noted that in many cases this basis is only a
very small fraction of the fair market value of the
property.
But, in addition, a gift of that property eliminates
the capital gains tax liability on the appreciation.
However, this liability is only hypothetical. If the
taxpayer would not have otherwise realized the gain in the
current tax year, the present value of the foregone tax
liability would be lower. Indeed, if the taxpayer would
otherwise have held the property until death, there would
have been no capital gains tax liability at all. The price—21—
of giving such property therefore depends on the
alternative use of the property.
Current taxpayer behavior is not a reliable guide to
the alternatives, however. Presently, taxpayer gifts of
appreciated property are treated as if held to death
regarding capital gains tax liability. Feldstein and
Taylor assumed some degree of delay in the alternative
realization of this property in their paper identifying
this effect. The magnitude of this effect is incalcuable
from existing data, but the direction is clear: to elevate
the price of giving above unity minus the taxpayer's
marginal rate. In the limiting case of greatly appreciated
property which would otherwise be bequeathed, the price
would be unity.
A final possibility exists under the Treasury
proposal. If the indexed basis exactly equals the fair
market value, then the price of giving the property exactly
equals the cash price. This is the limiting case on the
other extreme. Under no circumstances could the price of
giving appreciated property be lower, and, in the vast
majority of likely cases of gifts, the price of giving
would be likely to be higher. The simulations done in this
paper in general assume this latter limiting case which
tends to minimize the effect of the Treasury proposal. A
final simulation is performed which assumes the former
limiting case as well, however.—22—
The above discussion of price assumed that there would
be no change in the itemizer status of taxpayers. However,
the Treasury proposal makes dramatic changes in the number
of allowed deductions, and reduces others. For any current
itemizer who loses this status, the price of giving under
the Treasury proposal rises to unity. Under the Treasury
proposal, the zero bracket amount, or itemizing threshold,
is increased from $3400 to $3800 for married couples filing
jointly. The deduction for state and local taxes paid is
eliminated. A ceiling on the deductibility of non-mortgage
interest is imposed. Finally, the floor on charitable
contributions effectively raises the threshold for
attaining itemizer status.
As.a result of these changes, less than half of all
current itemizers will have the same status under the
Treasury proposal. The simulations show that for tax year
1985 only 43 percent of all current itemizers will remain
itemizers and take a charitable deduction. However, these
remaining itemizers currently make 62 percent of all
itemizer gifts.
In addition to restricting the number of itemizers, the
Treasury proposal allows only those itemizers who gave at
least 2 percent of their AGI to charity to receive a
charitable deduction. In 1979, about 60 percent of all
itemizers made charitable gifts of less than 2 percent of
their income. Because of the dramatic rise in the number—23—
of itemizing taxpayers just above the zero-bracket
threshold, the sample of itemizers for 1985 contains a
higher proportion of these relatively small givers —-65
percent. The Treasury proposal will lower the expected
level of giving with the reduction in marginal tax rates.
The simulations suggest that in 1985, under the proposed
set of tax rates, only 32 percent of the remaining
itemizers would give more than 2 percent of their incomes
to charity. However, those taxpayers give 71 percent of all
charitable gifts by the remaining itemizers.
Combining the effect of the reduced number of itemizers
and the 2 percent floor shows that only a small fraction of
current itemizers will still receive a tax incentive for
charitable giving. Given an itemizer population of over 41
million under current rules, only about 5.6 million, or 14
percent will still be receiving a tax reduction due to
charitable contributions under the Treasury proposal. This
is a dramatic reduction in the number of eligible taxpayers
by any measure. However, these simulations suggest that
these taxpayers make roughly 44 percent of all charitable
contributions currently. Thus, the effect of the complete
loss of a price incentive for charitable contributions will
be borne by only about half of all current gifts.—24—
In addition, the estimated 63.4 million non-itemizers
will lose their "above the line deduction" for half of
their charitable contributions under the Treasury proposal.
A significant portion of these non-itemizers made no
charitable contribution at all. However, a clear increase
in price will occur for all current non-itemizers under the
Treasury proposal.
Partially offsetting these changes is the reduction in
overall personal income tax liabilities of about 8.5
percent. This amounts to an increase in disposable
personal income of about 1 percent. However, within any
income gruop, taxpayers contributing relatively little will
receive larger tax reductions, on average, then large
contributors. The net effect of the 8.5 percent reduction
in personal tax liabilities is an increase in giving of
about 0.4 percent.
In summary therefore, the Treasury proposal will mean a
loss of deductibility for all non-itemizers as well as 85
percent of current itemizers. The remaining itemizers will
confront an average price of giving which is at least 10
percent higher than the current price of giving. Partially
offsetting this is an increase in disposable income due to
a net reduction in tax liabilities. The next section
discusses the impact of these changes on the level of
charitable giving.—25—
4. Effect on Giving
The preceding section outlined the effect of the
Treasury proposal on the price of charitable giving and the
number of itemizers who will retain a price incentive under
the proposal. Table 3 summarizes these price effects by
examining the average price of giving for current itemizers
under different assumptions about the Treasury proposal.
The first column of the table presents the average
price of giving faced by current itemizers. The second
column weights this price of giving by the number of
dollars given. The first row presents these measures of
the average price of giving under current law. Row 2
presents the average prices if the proposed rates were in
place but no other changes were made. Row 3 presents the
average price for current itemizers if the proposed changes
in the definition of itemized deductions were made as well
as the rate reductions. The fourth row also includes the
effect of the floor on the average price of giving for
current itemizers. The final row presents the average
price of giving for current itemizers if we assume that the
effect of the changes in the treatment of appreciated
property will remove the tax incentive to make gifts of
this property.—26—
The first column in Table 3 is a measure of the breadth
of the effct of the Treasury proposal among taxpayers. The
second column better represents the effect of the proposal
of the level of giving. The proposed Treasury rates will
raise the average price faced by current itemizers by 6
cents, or about 8 percent, but will raise the average price
of giving by almost 8 cents or over 11 percent. This
suggests that the rate reduction will have more of an
effect on big givers than small givers.
On the other hand, the proposed changes in deduction
rules' will raise the average price faced by itemizers an
additional 10 cents or 13 percent, but raise the average
price of giving by only 8 cents or 10.5 percent. This is,
of course, because big givers will still be itemizers under
the proposed Treasury rules. Similarly, the 2 percent
floor raises the average price facing itemizers by 6 cents
--7percent --butraises the average price of giving only
3 cents. It should be noted that many small givers were
already facing a price of one due to the deduction rules
nad therefore had no increase in price when the floor was
added.
Finally, Table 3 presents the effect of assuming that
the change in capital gains rules would effectively raise
the price of giving appreciated property to unity. As
noted in the previous section, this represents a limiting
case. As is clear from the table, only relatively large—27—
donors would be affected by this proposal, with an increase
of 2.5 percent in the average price of giving.
Alternatively, this increae many be viewed as a 22 percent
reduction in the price incentive remaining after the other
provisions are in place. The actual effect of the
appreciated property rules should be viewed as a weighted
average of the .89 price and the .914 price.
As noted in the previous section, the proposed tax
rules will also increase the disposable income of
taxpayers. The resulting income effect is combined with
the price effect described above and the overall effect on
giving is presented in Table 4. Estimates using both the
constant elasticity model and the variable elasticity
model, discussed previously, are presented.
Under either model of taxpayer resposnse, the decline
in giving is in excess of 20 percent. The constant
elasticity model predicts a 23 percent decline in giving
without counting the capital gains rules changes while the
variable elasticity model predicts a 21 percent decline.
Including the limiting case on capital gains, the predicted
declines are 28 percent and 25 percent respectively.
The effect of different elasticity assumptions can be
seen by comparing the step—by-step effects of the Treasury
bill. The variable elasticity model, with higher
elasticities for upper income groups, predicts a bigger
decline in giving due to the rate reduction, which affects—28—
those groups more. On the other hand, the change in the
rules for itemizers and the 2 percent floor, both of which
have a more dramatic impact on middle income groups, have a
bigger impact using the constant elasticity model. The
effect of the proposed elimination of the "above the line"
deduction for non-itemizers is shown in part b of Table 4.
Here the different models show dramatically different
effects. The average price of giving in 1985 for
non-itemizers is 92 cents. The constant elasticity
assumption of —1.2 for price would convert this into a 9.5
percent decline in giving which is partially offset by the
income effect resulting from the tax reduction. A net
decline of 9.1 percent is predicted. On the other hand,
the variable elasticity model assumes price elasticities
for low income taxpayers which are only about half as
great. Thus, the overall decline in the predicted level of
non-itemizer giving is only half as great.
The effect of different elasticity assumptions also
shows up in the percent decline in itemizer giving when
analyzed by income class. Table 5 presents these results.
The constant elasticity model shows much higher predicted
declines for giving in lower income groups and much lower
A
declinesin upper income groups. The minimum declines
presented exclude any effect of the changed treatment of
capital gains while the maximum declines represent the
limiting case discussed earlier.—29—
In summary, the primary difference caused by the
assumption of the variable elasticity model shown earlier
instead of a constant elasticity model is in the
distribution of the effects of the Treasury proposal.
Either model shows a significant decline in the overall
level of giving. To the extent that different income
groups contribute to different charities, a test of the
relative validity of the competing models would be provided
by the effects on different charities resulting from
implementation of the Treasury proposal.—30—
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Average Price of Giving for Current Itemizers
Itemizers Weighted Weighted by
Proposal Egaiiy DollarsGiyen
CurrentLaw .747 .700
Treasury Rates .807 .779
With New Deduction Rules .910 .861
With 2 Percent Floor .971 .890
With Capital Gains Rules





With New Deduction Rules
With 2 Percent Floor




























Variable Elasticity Model Constant Elasticity Model
Class Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum
under 10 3 7 7 13
10—15 3 7 9 15
15—20 6 9 12 16
20—25 9 12 16 19
25—30 11 14 17 21
30—40 14 17 20 23
40—50 18 20 23 26
50—75 23 27 27 31
75—100 22 27 24 29
100—200 31 40 30 39
200—500 44 57 36 48
500—1000 57 73 39 55
over 1000 77 87 50 62
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